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Criminal Law.  State v. Gumkowski, 223 A.3d 321 (R.I. 2020).  The 
overwhelming weight of circumstantial evidence that a defendant 
committed a murder, combined with some physical evidence, is 
enough for a jury to convict a defendant of said murder.  This 
evidence should be considered in full when assessing the defend-
ant’s motion for a new trial. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On May 11, 2011, defendant Matthew Gumkowski 
(Gumkowski) allegedly slashed the throat and burned the home of 
Michael DiRaimo (DiRaimo).1  Based on circumstantial evidence, 
including telephone records, cell-tower pings, text messages 
between the defendant and the decedent, and finding DiRaimo’s 
cellphone in Gumkowski’s possession after the murder, the State 
charged Gumkowski with first-degree murder and first-degree 
arson.2  Gumkowski was tried in Providence County Superior 
Court, and the jury found Gumkowski guilty on both counts.3 
Gumkowski immediately filed a motion with the Superior 
Court for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Superior Court 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.4  The trial justice heard the motion 
on July 12, 2016, and denied the motion in an oral decision on the 
same day.5  The Superior Court sentenced Gumkowski to life 
imprisonment for first-degree murder followed by forty-five years 
for first-degree arson.6 
Gumkowski appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the 
trial justice’s denial of his motion for a new trial.7  In his petition, 
Gumkowski argued that the trial justice was wrong in her denial of 
1. State v. Gumkowski, 223 A.3d 321, 323 (R.I. 2020).
2. Id.
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his motion for a new trial because the verdict was against the 
weight of the evidence.8  In particular, Gumkowski argued that the 
evidence did not support the conclusion that he was the perpetrator 
and did not support a finding of premeditation beyond a reasonable 
doubt.9  The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the 
judgment.10 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the appeal, the Court turned to the standards 
of review for Rule 33 motions, which are found in State v. 
Johnson.11  In relevant part, the Court in Johnson held that a trial 
justice, when presented with a Rule 33 motion, “acts as a thirteenth 
juror and exercises independent judgment on the credibility of 
witnesses and on the weight of the evidence.”12  The judge thereby 
conducts an independent assessment of the entirety of the evidence 
to determine whether she would have reached a different 
conclusion than the jury.13  In the case of Gumkowski, the Court 
determined that the trial justice had correctly applied and analyzed 
Gumkowski’s motion by the Johnson standard.14  The Court 
therefore upheld the trial court’s denial of the motion.15 
The Court then turned to Gumkowski’s argument that the 
weight of the evidence did not support finding that he was the 
perpetrator of the murder and arson.  Gumkowski argued that no 
reasonable jury could find that the text messages proved that he 
had motive to kill DiRaimo, and that a reasonable jury could only 
conclude that his possession of DiRaimo’s cellphone was at best 
proof of theft.16  Furthermore, Gumkowski maintained that the 
excerpts of text messages between Gumkowski and DiRaimo 
presented by the State were misleading because they caused the 
jury to overlook the entirety of DiRaimo’s text-messaging history.17  
8. Id.
9. Id. at 329.
10. Id. at 332.
11. Id. at 329 (citing State v. Johnson, 199 A.3d 1046, 1051 (R.I. 2019)).
12. Johnson, 199 A.3d at 1050–51.
13. Id. at 1051.




2021] SURVEY SECTION 851 
The Court disagreed with Gumkowski on all three fronts and 
instead agreed with the trial justice who held that the weight of the 
evidence was sufficient.18  The Court agreed with the trial judge 
that from the text messages “the jury reasonably inferred as does 
the [c]ourt the [d]efendant went to DiRaimo’s house, killed him, set 
the house on fire to cover up the murder, took the phone and went 
home, and it was indeed the [d]efendant who took the phone.”19  
Ultimately, after reviewing the complete collection of text messages 
and phone records between Gumkowski and DiRaimo, the Court 
concurred that the pings on DiRaimo’s cellphone matched the 
State’s timeline for the murder and arson and that the 
circumstantial evidence was overwhelmingly in support of placing 
an increasingly angry Gumkowski at DiRaimo’s residence at the 
time of the murder and fire.20  Finally, the Court agreed with the 
trial justice that neither the judge nor the jury were misled by the 
State’s emphasis on the communications between Gumkowski and 
DiRaimo.21 
Finally, Gumkowski argued that the verdict was against the 
weight of the evidence because the evidence presented at trial could 
not support a finding of premeditation.22  His reasoning was 
threefold: first, there was no evidence of planning; second, no rea-
sonable juror could have found premeditation in the text messages; 
and third, the defensive wounds found on DiRaimo’s hands 
disproved the classification of first-degree murder.23  The Court 
agreed with the trial judge that the violence of the crime combined 
with the wounds to the decedent’s hands made it likely that these 
were defensive wounds and indicative of a premeditated murder.24 
The Court agreed noted, as had the trial judge, that evidence 
of a plan is not required to prove premeditation, so his first 
argument did not hold water.25  Furthermore, as the trial judge had 
remarked, “[t]he evidence was overwhelming that someone 
committed first degree murder in the killing of Michael DiRaimo. 
18. Id. at 329–30.
19. Id. at 330 (internal quotations omitted).
20. Id. at 331.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 331–32.
24. Id. at 332.
25. Id. (citing State v. Gillespie, 960 A.2d 969, 977 (R.I. 2008)).
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His throat was slashed almost from ear to ear.  It was particularly 
malicious.”26  Accordingly, the Court upheld the trial justice’s 
rulings, concluded that the jury’s findings were reasonable, and 
determined that the weight of the evidence fully supported the      
conviction.27 
COMMENTARY 
Murder in the first degree is one of the most heinous crimes 
addressed by our court system, and the burden of proof is 
accordingly heavy.  In order to find a defendant guilty, the jury 
must find that the state proved the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  This is why conviction upon circumstantial 
evidence deserves the utmost scrutiny.  In her review of Gumkow-
ski’s motion for a new trial, the trial justice remarked, “[t]he 
evidence was overwhelming that someone committed first degree 
murder in the killing of Michael DiRaimo. . . .  It was particularly 
malicious.”28  It could be argued that the evidence, being entirely 
circumstantial, did not meet the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard. 
Likewise the distinction between murder in the first and  
second degrees sits on a hair’s edge: “[f]irst-degree murder requires 
that the defendant harbored a more-than-momentary intent to kill 
prior to committing the homicide.”29  Accordingly, “[t]he premedi-
tation necessary to establish first-degree murder must have existed 
for some appreciable length of time before the killing; it must have 
existed for more than just a moment.”30  These incredibly fine 
distinctions, distinctions that can change the course of a person’s 
life, are almost too ephemeral to be ascertained with only 
circumstantial evidence.  The violence of the crime has been 
established, but it could be argued that the defendant’s mens rea 
has not been sufficiently established.  However, in this case, both 
the trial justice and the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the 
evidence was strong enough to implicate the defendant and prove 
him guilty of murder in the first degree. 
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Gillespie, 960 A.2d at 977.
30. State v. Amazeen, 526 A.2d 1268, 1271 (R.I. 1987).
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, where 
overwhelming circumstantial evidence supports a finding that a 
defendant was the perpetrator of a crime, a trial court does not err 
in denying a defendant’s motion for a new trial under Rule 33 of the 
Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The 
Court further held that evidence of defensive wounds on a 
victim’s hands, combined with a violent and fatal attack, can 
support a finding of premeditation. 
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